mirror of
https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView.git
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162 lines
8.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
162 lines
8.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/sh
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# Docker entrypoint for WiFi-DensePose sensing server.
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#
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# Supports two usage patterns:
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#
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# 1. No arguments — use defaults from environment:
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# docker run -e CSI_SOURCE=esp32 ruvnet/wifi-densepose:latest
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#
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# 2. Pass CLI flags directly:
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# docker run ruvnet/wifi-densepose:latest --source esp32 --tick-ms 500
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# docker run ruvnet/wifi-densepose:latest --model /app/models/my.rvf
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#
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# Environment variables:
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# CSI_SOURCE — data source. Valid values:
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# auto — try ESP32 then Windows WiFi, **fail-loud if no
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# real hardware is detected** (issue #937 fix:
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# the server no longer silently falls back to
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# synthetic data — that's now opt-in only).
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# esp32 — listen for UDP CSI on the configured port.
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# wifi — Windows-native WiFi capture.
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# simulated — explicit demo mode with synthetic CSI.
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# Default is `auto`. Set CSI_SOURCE=simulated when you want
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# fake data tagged as such; never set it implicitly.
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# MODELS_DIR — directory to scan for .rvf model files (default: data/models)
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# RUVIEW_UDP_ALLOW / RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN — ADR-296 UDP source guard.
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# Setting either makes the entrypoint bind UDP on 0.0.0.0 so
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# ESP32 frames on the published 5005/udp port can arrive.
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# RUVIEW_UDP_BIND — explicit UDP bind; overrides the choice above.
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set -e
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# ── Issue #864: fail-closed on default posture ───────────────────────────────
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# The pre-fix default was: empty RUVIEW_API_TOKEN (auth off) + --bind-addr
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# 0.0.0.0 + docker-compose publishing :3000/:3001/:5005 → an unauthenticated
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# attacker on any reachable network segment could read /api/v1/sensing/latest
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# and the /ws/sensing live stream. That posture is unsafe on guest WiFi,
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# untrusted LANs, accidentally-port-forwarded hosts, or any reverse-proxied
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# deployment. Refuse to start with this combination.
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#
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# Escape hatches (operator must opt in explicitly):
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# * Set RUVIEW_API_TOKEN to a strong secret → auth enabled on /api/v1/*.
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# * Set RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1 (or true/yes/on, any case) →
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# preserves the pre-fix behaviour; only safe on an isolated trust boundary.
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# * Set RUVIEW_BIND_ADDR to a loopback / private interface → unauth is fine
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# when the socket isn't reachable. The auto-bind nudges toward 127.0.0.1.
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#
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# This check runs only for the default sensing-server path (no args + flag-only
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# args). The `cog-ha-matter` / `homecore` routes below are excluded because
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# they own their own auth lifecycle.
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case "${1:-}" in
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cog-ha-matter|ha-matter|homecore|homecore-server) ;;
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*)
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# Same spellings the sensing-server accepts for its boolean env flags.
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case "${RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED:-}" in
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1|[Tt][Rr][Uu][Ee]|[Yy][Ee][Ss]|[Oo][Nn]) __allow_unauth=1 ;;
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*) __allow_unauth=0 ;;
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esac
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if [ -z "${RUVIEW_API_TOKEN:-}" ] && [ "$__allow_unauth" != "1" ]; then
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# If the operator hasn't overridden the bind, refuse outright on
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# the default 0.0.0.0. If they've nailed it to loopback (or a
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# specific private address they trust), let it run.
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__bind_default="${RUVIEW_BIND_ADDR:-0.0.0.0}"
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case "$__bind_default" in
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127.*|localhost|::1)
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: ;; # loopback bind is safe even without a token
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*)
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echo "[entrypoint] ERROR: refusing to start sensing-server with default" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] posture: RUVIEW_API_TOKEN is unset AND bind is" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] ${__bind_default}. /ws/sensing streams live sensing" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] frames; that data would be readable by anyone who" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] can reach this host. Pick one:" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] docker run -e RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=\$(openssl rand -hex 32) ..." >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] docker run -e RUVIEW_BIND_ADDR=127.0.0.1 ..." >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] docker run -e RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1 ... # only on trusted network" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] See https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/issues/864" >&2
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exit 64
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;;
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esac
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fi
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;;
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esac
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# Route to cog-ha-matter (ADR-116) when invoked as:
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# docker run <image> cog-ha-matter [--flags]
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# or via the short alias `ha-matter`. Strips the keyword and execs the
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# Home Assistant + Matter cog binary, defaulting --sensing-url to the
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# co-located sensing-server endpoint so docker-compose deployments work
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# out of the box.
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case "${1:-}" in
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cog-ha-matter|ha-matter)
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shift
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exec /app/cog-ha-matter \
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--sensing-url "${SENSING_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:3000}" \
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"$@"
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;;
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homecore|homecore-server)
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# Route to the HOMECORE native Rust port of Home Assistant
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# (ADRs 126-134, v0.10.0). Default bind matches HA at :8123.
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shift
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exec /app/homecore-server \
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--bind "${HOMECORE_BIND:-0.0.0.0:8123}" \
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"$@"
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;;
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esac
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# If the first argument looks like a flag (starts with -), prepend the
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# server binary so users can just pass flags:
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# docker run <image> --source esp32 --tick-ms 500
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if [ "${1#-}" != "$1" ] || [ -z "$1" ]; then
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# ── Issue #2089: UDP CSI ingest posture inside a container ───────────────
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# ADR-296 defaults the UDP receiver to 127.0.0.1. Inside a container that
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# bind can never receive from a published port, so no node ever appears.
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# We bind 0.0.0.0 only when the operator has configured an ADR-296 guard
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# (RUVIEW_UDP_ALLOW or RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN); without one the server
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# would refuse a routable bind, so we keep loopback and say why instead.
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# An explicit RUVIEW_UDP_BIND or --udp-bind always wins.
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case "${RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN:-}" in
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1|yes|YES|on|ON|TRUE|True) export RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN=true ;;
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0|no|NO|off|OFF|FALSE|False) export RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN=false ;;
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esac
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__udp_bind_arg=0
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__udp_guard_arg=0
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for __arg in "$@"; do
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case "$__arg" in
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--udp-bind|--udp-bind=*) __udp_bind_arg=1 ;;
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--udp-allow|--udp-allow=*|--udp-insecure-lan) __udp_guard_arg=1 ;;
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esac
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done
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if [ -z "${RUVIEW_UDP_BIND:-}" ] && [ "$__udp_bind_arg" = 0 ]; then
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if [ -n "${RUVIEW_UDP_ALLOW:-}" ] || [ "${RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN:-}" = true ] \
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|| [ "$__udp_guard_arg" = 1 ]; then
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export RUVIEW_UDP_BIND=0.0.0.0
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echo "[entrypoint] UDP CSI receiver: binding 0.0.0.0 inside the container" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] (a source guard is set: RUVIEW_UDP_ALLOW or RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN)." >&2
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else
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case "${CSI_SOURCE:-auto}" in
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simulated|simulate) ;;
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*)
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echo "[entrypoint] NOTE: UDP CSI receiver stays on 127.0.0.1 (ADR-296 default)." >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] Inside a container that bind cannot receive ESP32 frames from" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] a published 5005/udp port, so no node will appear. To ingest:" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] -e RUVIEW_UDP_ALLOW=<node-ip-or-cidr> (restrict sources), or" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] -e RUVIEW_UDP_INSECURE_LAN=true (accept spoofing risk)" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] Docker Desktop/OrbStack on macOS rewrite the source to the bridge" >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] gateway, so the allowlist must name <gateway>/32, not the LAN subnet." >&2
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echo "[entrypoint] See https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/issues/2089" >&2
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;;
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esac
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fi
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fi
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set -- /app/sensing-server \
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--source "${CSI_SOURCE:-auto}" \
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--tick-ms 100 \
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--ui-path /app/ui \
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--http-port 3000 \
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--ws-port 3001 \
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--bind-addr "${RUVIEW_BIND_ADDR:-0.0.0.0}" \
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"$@"
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fi
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exec "$@"
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