* feat(flutter): identify Dart snapshot builds by pure APK parsing Add a flutter-provider family with one operation, identify_flutter_build, that reads an APK's lib/<abi>/libapp.so and libflutter.so through the hardened ZIP reader and reports build facts as observations: - The Dart VM snapshot hash, read 20 bytes after every snapshot magic (f5f5dcdc). The vm and isolate sections are cross-checked: agreeing sections collapse to one snapshot_hash, disagreeing sections keep every candidate with snapshot_hash null and partial coverage. - Per-ABI library digests and byte sizes, plus the engine library's GNU build-id note and any labeled 'Dart VM version' or Android clang/LLVM toolchain strings, verbatim; release builds without a version string report null rather than a guess. - The APK is digested before parsing so Evidence binds the observation to the exact input, and a target with no libapp.so reports not-detected with complete coverage. The scanner is streaming with explicit pending-magic and rescan bookkeeping, so chunk boundaries cannot double-count or drop sections, and magic-free streams never accumulate. No engine, no external lookups: the hash-to-SDK mapping stays with external datasets by design. Verified against Flutter Gallery 2.9.2 (112 MB, three ABIs): every ABI reports the same agreeing hash 65817c30a78bb44c3dc3771876b6010a from two sections, per-ABI build-ids, and the clang toolchain line; a plain aapt2-built APK reports not-detected with complete coverage. Scanner goldens come from the same libraries. READMEs carry the new 'Flutter apps' row in every supported language. * feat(flutter): inspect Dart AOT snapshots through the ELF symbol table Add inspect_dart_aot to the flutter family: for one ABI's libapp.so it locates the four _kDart*Snapshot* symbols through the ELF dynamic symbol table (ELF32 and ELF64 little-endian, bounds-checked reads; a payload without exported symbols is refused), reports each section's offset and size, validates data-section headers (magic, kind, length; instructions sections honestly report nulls for the fields their layout does not carry), and projects a bounded string pool from the isolate data section: distinct package: source URIs (the app's dependency inventory), dart: SDK URIs, and identifier-shaped tokens, each with counts, bounds, and partial coverage when truncated. The string pool is labeled as a byte-pattern projection, not deserialized cluster semantics: typed class and function recovery remains an SDK-specific parser, which the snapshot hash now unlocks. The ABI is caller-selected with a deterministic default (arm64-v8a, x86_64, then first available). Verified against Flutter Gallery 2.9.2: all four symbols on both ELF64 (arm64-v8a) and ELF32 (armeabi-v7a) images, header validation, hash agreement with identify_flutter_build, and a 756 package: / 201 dart: URI pool from the isolate data section; goldens in DartElf.test.ts come from the same libraries. * fix(flutter): own snapshots, bound image reads, and preserve cancellation Mirror the ownership bar the maintainers applied across the merged JEB, ADB, and Apktool PRs: - Copy the admitted APK into a provider-owned, read-only snapshot (EXCL create, chmod 0400) before digesting and parsing; every later read uses the snapshot, so a concurrently modified original cannot mix into one observation. The result reports the snapshot's byte size and digest. - Retain failed snapshot-root cleanup in a provider set and retry it on close(), throwing an aggregate error when a root is still owned; root removal is injectable so the retention is testable. - Allocate the AOT image buffer at exactly the declared library size before reading (bounded before allocation, not concat-after-stream), keep the 256 MiB ceiling, and check cancellation between digest and stream chunks through a captured abort reason. - Accept APK paths containing spaces (covered by a fixture test) and escape the ABI pattern's dash for v-mode regex compatibility. Also add tests for cleanup retention with close retry and for cancellation before any snapshot root is created. * docs(flutter): cover the Italian README with the Flutter row The Italian translation landed between the merged feature PRs; its table now carries every merged row plus this one, keeping its documentation-link set identical to README.md. * fix(flutter): make the ABI pattern portable for v-mode validators Use a hex-escaped hyphen in the ABI character class, matching the form the ADB portability fix uses, so clients compiling advertised schemas in unicodeSets mode accept the inspect_dart_aot input schema. * refactor(flutter): reuse shared harnesses and deduplicate the vertical The duplicate-detection gate (jscpd, 2.5% threshold) tipped to 2.51% with the flutter files added. Reuse the existing machinery instead of repeating it: - FlutterBuildAnalysisService delegates to executeProviderOperation, the shared admission/Evidence composition, instead of restating its body. - The CLI registers both commands from one table-driven spec. - Boundary tests use the shared serveCli and assertAdvertisedMcpContracts harnesses rather than hand-rolled equivalents. - The provider test consolidates the four payload-shape cases into one table-driven case; the service test uses one admission table and distinct phrasings. Duplicate lines fall from 2.51% to 2.48%, back under the gate. * fix(flutter): address review findings from real-app verification CassieFox23 verified the PR against three real F-Droid Flutter apps and a control app, and found five gaps. All are fixed and re-verified against cone (info.tangential.cone), one of the tested apps: - Build-id: the scanner now reads the descriptor length from the note header instead of assuming 20 bytes, so 8-byte ids from older toolchains parse; the schema accepts 8-128 hex characters. Verified against cone's readelf-reported ids on all three ABIs. - Compiler line: the toolchain capture bound rises from 200 to 500 characters, keeping cone's 262-character clang line verbatim. - Zero-byte libapp.so: the extraction target is created before streaming, so an empty entry yields a clean unsupported_target refusal for inspect_dart_aot and elf_header_valid: false with partial coverage for identify_flutter_build, instead of a raw ENOENT with code UNKNOWN. - Truncated library: identify_flutter_build marks fewer than two snapshot sections as partial coverage with a limitation naming the count, and a missing ELF magic gets its own limitation. - Docs: the default ABI preference now matches the code exactly (arm64-v8a, x86_64, x86, armeabi-v7a, then the rest alphabetically). Also: every test that read the author's /tmp/opencode goldens now builds a self-contained synthetic ELF64 image with dynsym, four snapshot symbols, two snapshot sections, and a string pool, so the suite runs anywhere; the verify lane now requires a present hex build-id per ABI instead of accepting null. * fix(flutter): address the Codex review findings Eight findings, all applied: - P1: SnapshotHashScanner keeps candidates in a Set (no quadratic Array.includes) with a 64-distinct-hash cap, so a hostile payload of magic+hash records cannot stall the scan or bloat the response. - P1: projectStringPool stops admitting new distinct entries once each category reaches twice its projection bound and reports collectionCapped; allocation and sorting now track the response, not the payload. - P2: ZIP reader rejections during entry iteration or entry streaming map into the typed error algebra (cancellation vs input refusal) instead of escaping as unhandled exceptions in both operations. - P2: magic_valid now marks coverage only for the *Data symbols; a complete four-symbol image with valid data magics reports complete coverage (the instruction symbols intentionally lack the magic). - P2: the MCP server closes the Flutter provider during shutdown, so a retained snapshot root is retried and reported, not leaked. - P2: LabeledStringScanner commits matches only when a printable run is delimiter-terminated; the carry grows to 600 bytes so a 500-character toolchain line survives any chunk boundary untruncated. - P2: both Flutter tool effects declare writesFilesystem: true; the owned APK snapshot and extracted libapp.so are temporary writes. - P2: the verify lane asserts every ABI agrees on exactly one snapshot hash instead of discarding the computed set. * fix(flutter): address the second Codex review round Nine findings on the first-round fixes: - P1: identify_flutter_build enforces a cumulative extraction budget (768 MiB) across every library entry, not just per library, so an APK with many ABIs cannot stream an unbounded total. - P1: a single NUL-free printable run stops materializing at 1024 bytes and marks the pool capped, so an adversarial one-run section cannot allocate unbounded strings. - P1: ELF cString bounds the NUL-terminator scan to the name maximum plus one, so malformed symbol tables cannot scan the whole image per entry. - P2: mapReaderFailure distinguishes ArtifactReaderFailure texts — budget/limit rejections map to resource constraints, integrity failures (CRC/overlap/signature) to their own input refusal — instead of collapsing all reader failures into one message. - P2: the labeled-string carry is cleared when a delimiter commits a run, so consecutive toolchain lines are never concatenated. - P2: string-pool counts are renamed *_count_at_least and documented as lower bounds, because capped collection discards values beyond twice the projection bound. - P2: inspect_dart_aot marks hash disagreements, non-pair source counts, and candidate-cap saturation as partial coverage. - P2: only valid lowercase-hex hash records count as snapshot sources; complete magic records with non-hex fields do not inflate agreement. - P2: the per-entry size refusal in inspect_dart_aot moves after ABI selection, so an oversized unselected ABI no longer refuses a small request. * fix(flutter): address the third Codex review round Five findings: - P2: the owned snapshot revalidates the source after the copy (size, mtime, inode), so an in-place replacement or swap mid-copy refuses the observation instead of publishing mixed bytes. - P2: a failed ZipArtifactReader close retains the snapshot root for close() retry instead of silently swallowing the descriptor leak, in both operations. - P2: snapshot headers are parsed within their symbol bounds and a symbol smaller than the 16-byte header reports magic_valid false, so trailing-image bytes can no longer fake a valid data section. - P2: the verify lane counts provider.close() cleanup failures as lane failures instead of certifying a run with retained roots. - P2: LabeledStringScanner reports toolchain_capped when further distinct matching lines are observed past the 4-line projection; identify marks such results partial with a naming limitation. * fix(flutter): address rounds three and four of the Codex review Round three (one missed finding) plus round four (five findings): - P2: the GNU build-id note descriptor size is decoded from all four bytes of the little-endian field, rejecting nonzero high bytes instead of masking them to 16 bits. - P1: the Flutter MCP handlers route through createContractToolHandler and the session's analysisAdmission, so close_binary and snapshot operations drain in-flight Flutter calls instead of racing them. - P2: the owned-snapshot copy is a streamed, abort-checked write (no copyFile), so cancellation stops the write promptly while the source-identity revalidation (size, mtime, inode) still guards against mid-copy replacement. - P2: identify marks any snapshot_hash_sources value other than exactly two as partial, matching the inspection path's pair requirement. - P2: the verify lane refuses to run without --apk (exit 2) instead of printing a false-green pass, and the engine check requires every libapp-carrying ABI to have a present libflutter with a valid hex build-id rather than filtering missing engines away vacuously. * fix(flutter): address the fifth Codex review round Six findings plus the upstream duplication baseline: - P2: the flutter-provider kind reports available in the capability inventory, so binary_session no longer lists always-registered Flutter tools as provider_missing. - P2: printable runs that exceed the 1024-byte cap are discarded at their delimiter instead of emitting their truncated prefix as a fabricated observation. - P2: ELF symbols must fit inside the file-backed portion of their PT_LOAD segment (p_filesz), so addresses in gaps or BSS are refused instead of accepting unrelated bytes. - P2: the build-id carry spans the complete 80-byte maximum note (16-byte header + 64-byte descriptor) so chunk-boundary splits cannot drop the first byte. - P2: the labeled-string carry is sized for the toolchain pattern's true 605-byte maximum, not the previous 600. - P2: the AOT completeness predicate requires exactly two sources and one candidate unconditionally, so zero-source images with valid data magics report partial instead of complete. Also: the shared ELF fixture builder and snapshot-section helper moved to a dedicated FlutterTestFixtures module, eliminating cross-file test duplication; jscpd now passes at 2.50% while main sits at 2.52%. * fix(flutter): address the sixth Codex review round Five findings: - P2: snapshot-hash scanning is bounded to the exported data symbols' byte ranges, so decoy or stale magic/hash sequences elsewhere in the image cannot inflate source counts or contribute candidates. - P2: labeled-string runs longer than the carry bound are rejected instead of truncated, preventing a regex prefix from being published as a verbatim source string. - P2: the AOT image reread checks cancellation between file reads and before the synchronous parsing stage, so a cancelled caller cannot receive a success from a completed 256 MiB read. - P2: the verify lane requires exactly two snapshot sources per ABI, matching the provider's pair requirement, instead of accepting any count >= 2. - P2: ELF section and program header entry sizes are validated against the class-defined minimum widths before walking either table, so undersized entries cannot cause field reads to cross into neighboring bytes. * fix(flutter): address the seventh Codex review round Six findings: - P2: data-symbol ranges are deduplicated by offset and size, so aliased symbols mapping to the same bytes are scanned once and the result marks partial coverage with a limitation naming the shared range. - P2: openEntrySafely forwards return/throw to the underlying Readable's iterator, so an early for-await exit closes the ZIP entry stream and releases its producer instead of leaking a backpressured pipe. - P2: inspect_dart_aot now reports snapshot_hash_candidates and snapshot_hash_sources alongside snapshot_hash, so a null hash from conflicting evidence is distinguishable from missing hash data. - P2: overlong printable runs only set toolchain_capped when they begin with a recognized label prefix (Dart VM version: or Android (); other long strings such as license text are skipped without marking partial. - P2: readElfSymbol falls back to PT_DYNAMIC/DT_SYMTAB when section headers are absent (e_shnum 0, ET_DYN), so stripped Flutter libraries with exported snapshot symbols are no longer refused; the dynamic table is bounded by DT_STRSZ, DT_SYMENT, and the image end. - P2: the verify lane exercises inspect_dart_aot for every ABI carrying libapp.so, not just the preferred default. * fix(flutter): address the eighth Codex review round Five findings: - P2: each data-symbol range gets a fresh SnapshotHashScanner so the carry from one noncontiguous slice cannot fabricate a record spanning into the next; results are aggregated after scanning. - P2: dynsym name lookups are bounded to the linked string table — st_name offsets outside the table and terminators beyond it are rejected instead of reading unrelated payload bytes as symbol names, in both the section-header and PT_DYNAMIC paths. - P2: identify_flutter_build routes its reader.entries and reader.open calls through the same collectEntriesSafely and openEntrySafely wrappers as inspect_dart_aot, so malformed ZIPs surface as input refusals instead of AnalysisProtocolError. - P2: mapReaderFailure recognizes ArtifactReaderFailure texts carrying a cancelled reason, mapping them to AnalysisCancelledError instead of AnalysisInputError. - P2: the cumulative extraction cap is enforced inside the chunk loop, not after each library completes, so refusal happens before the remaining bytes are streamed and hashed. * fix(flutter): harden streaming, sizes, and cancellation after self-review Four issues found in a systematic self-audit across all bug classes from eight Codex rounds: - createReadStream in both the digest function and the owned-snapshot copy now receives the AbortSignal directly, so cancellation aborts the filesystem read at the source instead of waiting for the next chunk to arrive on a slow filesystem. - The owned snapshot enforces a 2 GiB APK-level size cap before any copy I/O, so a path pointing at an enormous file is refused before disk usage grows. - identify_flutter_build preflights the sum of declared entry sizes against the 768 MiB cumulative budget, refusing before any ZIP extraction when the declared total already exceeds it. - The LabeledStringScanner triple result() call is collapsed to a single invocation (the previous code called result() three times in the emission, relying on end() being idempotent). No behavior change for valid inputs; all 36 tests, check:fast, and the cone verify lane pass unchanged. * fix(flutter): require structurally parseable ELF headers for complete coverage CassieFox23's third corrupt-header case: an ELF with valid magic but zeroed section/program header offsets passes the 4-byte magic check and the byte scanner still finds hash patterns in the data sections, so identify_flutter_build reports complete coverage for a structurally broken file. The elf_header_valid check now also verifies beyond the magic: e_type must be a known value (ET_REL/ET_EXEC/ET_DYN), at least one of e_shoff/e_phoff must be non-zero, and at least one of e_shnum/e_phnum must be non-zero. A file with valid magic but zeroed structure reports partial coverage with the existing ELF-magic limitation. * fix(flutter): validate ELF and snapshot coverage Share bounded ELF header parsing between identification and inspection. Accumulate headers across ZIP chunks and validate table entry widths and extents before claiming complete identification coverage. Bind AOT hashes to the exported VM and isolate headers, validate stored snapshot lengths including the magic bytes, and preserve partial evidence for missing, malformed, aliased, or overlapping data headers. Preserve native stream cancellations and APK resource constraints across both operations. Bound snapshot copies while streaming and retain useful input-failure diagnostics and lower-bound count wording. Validation: 72 focused tests; check:fast; check including formatting; docs:check; test discovery; jscpd; real cone APK and non-Flutter control on Linux. Verified CLI/MCP parity for valid and corrupted ELF headers and AOT inspection across three ABIs. Native Windows and macOS were not run. * fix(flutter): unify artifact ownership and bound ELF evidence * fix(flutter): preserve ELF provenance and partial coverage Read GNU build IDs only from bounded ELF note ranges and retain conflicting candidates. Preserve source versus owned storage failures and honor cancellation through parsing and final cleanup. Separate snapshot structure from string-pool coverage. Verify every Gallery ABI with digest-bound engine labels and URI counts, and document the supported snapshot-kind layout. --------- Co-authored-by: REA Contributor <contributor@rea.tools> Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
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Flutter build identification
REA identifies a Flutter app's build facts by pure parsing of its APK: the Dart VM snapshot hash, per-ABI library digests, the engine's GNU build-id, and any labeled version strings. No engine, no tool installation, no execution, and no external lookups — this family answers "which Dart SDK build is this, and what exactly is in the payload?" before any deeper native analysis.
This is the triage step for Flutter reversing: the snapshot hash is the artifact that maps to a Dart SDK release through an external dataset (such as the one reFlutter maintains), and knowing the SDK version is what makes SDK-layout-specific snapshot parsers applicable.
Answer an analyst question
rea identify-flutter-build /targets/Example.apk
rea inspect-dart-aot /targets/Example.apk
rea inspect-dart-aot /targets/Example.apk --abi armeabi-v7a
The equivalent MCP methods are identify_flutter_build (with path) and
inspect_dart_aot (with path and an optional abi; the default prefers
arm64-v8a, then x86_64, then x86, then armeabi-v7a, then the remaining
ABIs alphabetically).
What the AOT inspection returns
inspect_dart_aot reads one ABI's libapp.so in full and reports:
- Snapshot sections — the four
_kDart*Snapshot*symbols located through the ELF dynamic symbol table (ELF32 and ELF64, little-endian, every read bounds-checked), each with file offset, size, and — for data sections, which carry thef5f5dcdcmagic — the parsed header kind and length (the stored length excludes the four magic bytes). Data headers whose declared snapshot length does not fit their symbol retain their observed fields and report partial coverage. Complete structural coverage currently requires kind 3, the FullAOT value in the supported Dart 2.14 layout. Kind numbers vary across Dart releases; other values are preserved with partial coverage, without guessing their interpretation. A payload without exported snapshot symbols is refused rather than guessed at. - The snapshot hash from the header at the start of each exported data symbol. Complete hash coverage requires a valid header from both the VM and isolate; duplicate records inside one symbol cannot stand in for the other's header. Aliased or overlapping data symbols report partial coverage.
- A string-pool projection from the isolate data section: distinct
package:source URIs (the app's own and its dependencies' Dart files — a dependency inventory),dart:SDK URIs (which SDK libraries the app uses), and identifier-shaped tokens, each bounded with counts andcoverage: "partial"when truncated. On the reference target this counts 756 package URIs and 201 dart URIs on arm64-v8a and x86_64, and 212 / 48 on armeabi-v7a, retaining up to 500 of each in the response.libapp.coveragedescribes structural snapshot checks;string_pool.coveragedescribes the bounded projection. Overall coverage is partial when either facet is partial.
Interpret the result
flutter_detectedis true when anylib/<abi>/libapp.soexists. A negative answer reports complete coverage: absence is an answer.snapshot_hashis the Dart build hash observed 20 bytes after the snapshot magic (f5 f5 dc dc) insidelibapp.so. Identification scans byte patterns; AOT inspection reads the exported VM and isolate headers.snapshot_hash_sourcescounts the valid records observed by the chosen operation, and when they disagree the distinct values are kept insnapshot_hash_candidateswithsnapshot_hash: nullandcoverage: "partial"rather than silently picking one.elf_header_validchecks the supported little-endian ELF32/ELF64 header, table entry widths, and full table extents against the library's actual byte length. Truncated, malformed, or unsupported headers report false and partial coverage while retaining byte-scanned hashes. This header check does not establish valid table contents or exported symbols.libflutterfacts are per-ABI observations: byte size, SHA-256 digest, GNU build IDs from ELF-declaredPT_NOTE/SHT_NOTEranges, and any labeled strings the build carries. Release engine builds often strip theDart VM versionstring — absence is reported asnull, not guessed. Android clang/LLVM toolchain lines are reported verbatim as build provenance.build_id_candidatespreserves distinct IDs.build_idis populated only when all declared note ranges were examined and one ID was found; conflicting IDs or malformed/bounded note metadata make coverage partial. Matching bytes outside declared note ranges cannot supply a build ID.- Labeled strings must fit their complete grammar.
dart_version_cappedandtoolchain_cappedindependently report labels omitted by grammar or projection bounds; either makes identification coverage partial. Values split across read chunks are retained without publishing truncated prefixes. coverage: "partial"also appears when an ABI carrieslibapp.sowithoutlibflutter.so(or vice versa).- The APK itself is digested before parsing, so
target.sha256binds the observation to the exact input.
Limits
- Owned snapshots. Both operations copy the admitted APK into a
provider-owned, read-only snapshot before digesting and parsing, so a
concurrently modified original cannot mix into one observation; failed
reader closure and snapshot cleanup are retained and retried on
close(). The snapshot is removed only after all owned readers and file descriptors close successfully. Copying pins one admitted descriptor and compares its identity, size, mode and timestamps after the copy. Source permission failures remainaccess_denied, and source identity changes remainartifact_changed. Provider-owned storage failures report aresource_constraintwith their native I/O cause. Cancellation is checked during copying, metadata/symbol walks, string scanning, and after cleanup. - Bounded reads. APK snapshots are bounded at 2 GiB, including while
copying. Identification permits 768 MiB of cumulative library extraction;
declared sizes are checked before extraction. Library reads are bounded at 256 MiB each and ZIP
metadata at 8 MiB; the AOT image buffer is allocated at exactly the
declared size before reading. Exceeded budgets report
resource_constraint. - Engine notes. Engine libraries are spooled into the owned root. ELF headers, note tables and note payloads share an 8 MiB metadata budget; up to 64 distinct build IDs are retained. Exceeding either bound preserves the candidates already examined and reports partial coverage.
- Metadata and candidate capacity. Both operations refuse duplicate
relevant library paths. Inventory is limited to 32 ABIs and 1024 bytes per
relevant library path, independently of compressed size. Identification
refuses more than 64 distinct snapshot hashes with
resource_constraintrather than silently dropping conflicting evidence. - Selected ABI. AOT inspection applies the library budget to the selected
ABI after selection; an oversized unselected library does not block it.
Undefined dynamic-symbol imports are not treated as snapshot exports.
Section-stripped images require a bounded symbol count from
DT_HASHorDT_GNU_HASH; layouts without either are refused. Symbol names and their terminators must fit their linked string table. - REA performs no hash-to-SDK lookup: mapping the snapshot hash to a Dart SDK release requires an external dataset and is deliberately out of scope for this family.
- The AOT string pool is a byte-pattern projection, not deserialized
cluster semantics: typed class and function recovery requires an
SDK-specific parser (the snapshot layout changes per release — exactly
why the hash is the key), and
class_like_tokensinclude incidental matches. JEB's GUI Dart unit and native analysis oflibapp.socover some ground today.
Real verification
npm run verify:flutter -- --apk PATH [--plain-apk PATH] runs both tools
through compiled CLI and stdio MCP, compares Evidence, and checks every ABI.
Use --expectations scripts/fixtures/flutter-gallery-expectations.json with
the Gallery 2.9.2 release APK to check exact per-ABI engine labels,
URI counts and the snapshot hash against its pinned SHA-256. The verifier
requires complete structural snapshot coverage on every ABI and explicitly
reports the bounded pool projection as partial/unverified when truncated.
Other APKs need their own expectations file to verify exact engine labels
and URI counts; otherwise those facets are reported unverified.
The optional plain APK checks negative detection. Record: Flutter Gallery 2.9.2 (112 MB, three
ABIs) — every ABI reports the same agreeing hash
65817c30a78bb44c3dc3771876b6010a from two snapshot sections, per-ABI
engine build-ids, no labeled Dart version (as expected for a release
engine), and the Android clang toolchain line; a plain aapt2-built APK
reports not-detected with complete coverage. The suite uses self-contained
synthetic ELF images and scanner payloads; it does not read private local files.