Files
Donkie 0f3a3918c1 auth: focused integration test suite
101 tests covering the authentication system, run against a server with
SPOOLMAN_AUTH_ENABLED as a separate suite from the regression sweep.

Deliberately one SQLite variant rather than a fifth pass of the existing
four-database matrix. Nothing in spoolman/auth is database-specific, so
re-running the whole regression suite with auth on would quadruple the CI
bill to re-prove something none of those tests are about.

The tests live in tests_integration/tests_auth, a sibling of the regression
suite rather than a subdirectory of it, and the compose file mounts that
directory at the path the tester image's fixed entrypoint collects from. So
the auth suite runs exactly when asked and the regression runs can never
pick it up -- no entrypoint override, no collection guard, no way for the
two to interfere.

"sqlite-auth" is accepted by run.py but is not in the default target list,
so `poe itest` keeps meaning what it meant and `poe itest sqlite-auth` is
opt-in. CI gets its own small job for it, and the release gate now depends
on that job alongside the others.

Coverage:
  test_unauthenticated  every non-public route answers 401 without a
                        credential -- the black-box counterpart to the
                        import-time coverage assertion, and the test most
                        likely to catch a future route added without a gate
  test_setup            first claim succeeds, second is refused, username
                        stored lowercased
  test_login            success, wrong password, unknown user returning an
                        identical message, lockout with Retry-After, and
                        remember-me controlling cookie Max-Age
  test_csrf             cookie-authenticated writes need the header
  test_levels           the owner reaches read, edit and manage routes
  test_anonymous_read   the setting opens reads without opening writes, and
                        leaves the bulk exports closed
  test_websocket        rejection arrives as close code 4401, not as a failed
                        handshake -- the regression test for the uvicorn
                        behaviour that dictated the whole websocket design
  test_password         change requires the current password and takes effect

One test asserted that using 10 g leaves used_weight at 10. It is a running
total, and the spool was created with remaining_weight below the filament's
net weight, so it already stood at 500. Rewritten to assert the delta.

Verified by running both suites against a live server: 101 auth tests pass
with auth on, and the existing 372 regression tests still pass with auth off
and no test file edited.
2026-07-28 13:10:55 +02:00

130 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""Integration tests: the auth_anonymous_read setting.
An operator who wants a read-only public dashboard turns this on. It grants an
unauthenticated caller a principal at the read level -- nothing more -- so it must open
exactly the read routes and no others.
The setting is a database row rather than an environment variable, which means it can be
flipped at runtime by anyone at manage level. That makes 'turning it off again really
does close the door' a property worth asserting, not assuming.
"""
import httpx
import pytest
from .conftest import assert_code
SETTING = "/setting/auth_anonymous_read"
@pytest.fixture
def anonymous_read_on(owner: httpx.Client):
"""Turn the setting on for one test, and off again afterwards.
The teardown is not optional: leaving it on would silently defeat every 401
assertion in test_unauthenticated.py, which collects after this file.
"""
assert_code(owner.post(SETTING, json="true"), 200)
try:
yield
finally:
assert_code(owner.post(SETTING, json="false"), 200)
def test_setting_defaults_to_off(owner: httpx.Client, anonymous: httpx.Client) -> None:
"""With the setting off an unauthenticated read is refused."""
result = owner.get(SETTING)
assert_code(result, 200)
assert result.json()["value"] in {"false", "null"}
assert_code(anonymous.get("/spool"), 401)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/filament"), 401)
def test_anonymous_read_opens_read_routes(anonymous_read_on: None, anonymous: httpx.Client) -> None: # noqa: ARG001
"""With the setting on, read routes answer without any credential."""
assert_code(anonymous.get("/spool"), 200)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/filament"), 200)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/vendor"), 200)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/setting/"), 200)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/info"), 200)
def test_anonymous_read_is_advertised_in_config(anonymous_read_on: None, anonymous: httpx.Client) -> None: # noqa: ARG001
"""A client can discover the mode before deciding whether to prompt for a sign-in."""
result = anonymous.get("/auth/config")
assert_code(result, 200)
assert result.json()["anonymous_read"] is True
def test_anonymous_session_reports_anonymous(anonymous_read_on: None, anonymous: httpx.Client) -> None: # noqa: ARG001
"""The caller is anonymous, not authenticated, and holds read level only."""
result = anonymous.get("/auth/session")
assert_code(result, 200)
info = result.json()
assert info["authenticated"] is False
assert info["anonymous"] is True
assert info["level"] == "read"
assert info["is_admin"] is False
assert info["is_owner"] is False
def test_anonymous_read_does_not_open_writes(anonymous_read_on: None, anonymous: httpx.Client) -> None: # noqa: ARG001
"""Nothing above read opens up.
The status is 403 rather than 401: a principal was established, it simply does not
cover the level. See the note on the export test below -- the same reasoning applies
here, and the same caveat about what a client can do with the answer.
"""
assert_code(anonymous.post("/spool", json={"filament_id": 1}), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.post("/vendor", json={"name": "nope"}), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.post("/filament", json={"density": 1.25, "diameter": 1.75}), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.patch("/spool/1", json={"comment": "nope"}), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.put("/spool/1/use", json={"use_weight": 1}), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.delete("/spool/1"), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.post("/backup"), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.post("/setting/currency", json='"SEK"'), 403)
def test_anonymous_read_does_not_open_the_exports(
anonymous_read_on: None, # noqa: ARG001
anonymous: httpx.Client,
) -> None:
"""The bulk exports stay shut, which is the whole reason they sit at manage level.
'Read-only public dashboard' must not mean 'download the entire database', so this is
the assertion that gives the manage level on /export/* its purpose.
The answer is 403. AUTHENTICATION_PLAN.md describes these as endpoints that expose
the database in bulk and therefore refuse the anonymous reader outright, which
``require_level(allow_anonymous=False)`` exists to express -- but no route passes
that argument today, so the refusal comes from the level check instead. The door is
shut either way; only the status code differs. If the intent is later wired up, this
expectation becomes 401.
"""
assert_code(anonymous.get("/export/spools", params={"fmt": "json"}), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/export/filaments", params={"fmt": "json"}), 403)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/export/vendors", params={"fmt": "json"}), 403)
def test_turning_the_setting_off_closes_the_door(owner: httpx.Client, anonymous: httpx.Client) -> None:
"""The grant is revoked immediately, without a restart or a cache to wait out."""
assert_code(owner.post(SETTING, json="true"), 200)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/spool"), 200)
assert_code(owner.post(SETTING, json="false"), 200)
assert_code(anonymous.get("/spool"), 401)
def test_owner_still_works_while_anonymous_read_is_on(
anonymous_read_on: None, # noqa: ARG001
owner: httpx.Client,
) -> None:
"""A real session is not downgraded to the anonymous principal."""
result = owner.get("/auth/session")
assert_code(result, 200)
info = result.json()
assert info["anonymous"] is False
assert info["level"] == "manage"
assert_code(owner.get("/export/spools", params={"fmt": "json"}), 200)